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AN EMPLOYER'S UNILATERAL ACTION-AN
UNFAIR LABOR PRACTICE?*
J. GILMER BOWMAN, JR.**
THE DUTY TO BARGAIN COLLECTIVELY
During the Industrial Revolution, the growth of enormous industrial
establishments with a correspondingly large number of workers hired
to perform increasingly simple tasks manifested the inability of an
individual effectively to bargain with an employer concerning wages,
hours, and other terms and conditions of the employment relationship.
The resulting discontent among workers produced long and bitter,
often bloody, outbreaks of economic warfare between employers and
employees. In the abstract, freedom of contract was possible still,
but as a practical matter employment benefits and obligations were
largely established by managerial fiat. It was felt that if employees
could effectively unite for bargaining, their collective power might
balance that of the employer, thereby vitalizing the abstraction. The
enactment in 1935 of the National Labor Relations Act,' the Wagner
Act, represented, in essence, an attempt to strike that balance so as
to reduce or eliminate industrial strife in interstate commerce.
Section 7 of the act declared the right of employees to select a collec-
tive representative to bargain for them about wages, hours, and other
terms and conditions of employment.2 Furthermore, statutory pro-
tection was accorded this right. The protection took the form of pro-
scribing employer conduct described, in glittering generalities, as
unfair labor practices. 3 The National Labor Relations Board, here-
after referred to as the Board, was established 4 to preserve and ef-
fectuate the rights of employees as set out in section 7. It might also
be added that if employees were protected in organizing for bargaining
purposes, they might thereby be encouraged to do so.
*Submitted in an expanded form in satisfaction of the writing requirements
for the LL.M. degree, May, 1955, at Harvard University, Cambridge, Mas-
sachuetts.
**LL.B., Vanderbilt University, 1954: LL.M., Harvard University, 1955;
member, Tennessee Bar.
1. 49 STAT. 449 (1935), 29 U.S.C.A. §§ 151-166 (1946).
2. "Sec. 7. Employees shall have the right to self-organization, to form,
join, or assist labor organizations, to bargain collectively through representa-
tives of their own choosing, and to engage in other concerted activities for
the purpose of collective bargaining or other mutual aid or protection, and
shall also have the right to refrain from any or all of such activities except to
the extent that such right may be affected by an agreement requiring mem-
bership in a labor organization as a condition of employment as authorized
in section 8(a) (3)." 61 STAT. 147 (1947), 29 U.S.C.A. § 157 (Supp. 1955).
3. 49 STAT. 452 (1935), as amended, 29 U.S.C.A. § 158 (Supp. 1955).
4. 49 STAT. 451 (1935), as amended, 29 U.S.C.A. § 153 (Supp. 1955).
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By reason of the act, collective bargaining became mandatory when
employees in an appropriate unit properly designated a bargaining
representative, alternatively denominated a union, and collective
bargaining had been requested. 5 No longer could employment condi-
tions be established solely by employers. Attention herein will be
directed toward an examination and evaluation of the limitations
imposed by the act, as administered by the Board and the courts, on
an employer's freedom to establish employment conditions on his own
initiative, i.e., by unilateral action, after his employees have selected
a collective bargaining representative.
Before the Board determines whether an employer's unilateral ac-
tion is an unfair labor practice, it must first decide whether the subject
acted upon is a proper one for collective bargaining.6 If bargaining
on the subject is not required, it follows that the employer is free to
act at will about the matter. The Board and the courts have demon-
strated little, if any, hesitation in declaring what a party may be com-
pelled to bargain about even though it has been argued that this was
not a proper administrative or judicial function under the original
legislation.7 The guide for the determination of proper subjects for
bargaining seems to be the intimacy of their relation to the items
listed in section 9 (a) of the act, i.e., "rates of pay, wages, hours of
employment, or other conditions of employment." If the necessary
relationship can be found, then bargaining may be compelled.8
Through an extended series of cases, the Board has been at pains to
map out the subjects for bargaining.9 The rationalization for this
5. J. I. Case Co. v. NLRB, 321 U.S. 332 (1944); NLRB v. Columbian
Enameling & Stamping Co., 306 U.S. 292 (1939); M. H. Ritzwoller Co. v.
NLRB, 114 F.2d 432 (7th Cir. 1940); Long-Lewis Hardware Co., 90 N.L.R.B.
1403 (1950).
6. Note, Proper Subjects for Collective Bargaining: Ad Hoc v. Predictive
Definition, 58 YALE L.J. 803 (1949). Not every item proposed for bargaining
by an employer or a union must be discussed. American Radio, Ass'n., CIO,
82 N.L.R.B. 1344 (1949). On the other hand, it would seem that the parties
could discuss anything, at their discretion, even though the topic had not been
held to be within the terms of § 9 (a). Cox and Dunlop, Regulation of Collec-
tive Bargaining by the National Labor Relations Board, 63 HARV. L. REv. 389
(1950). However, adamant insistence on bargaining and agreement on an
item outside the requirements of § 9(a) as a prerequisite to concluding a
collective bargaining agreement has been held to be an unfair labor practice
since this is said to evince a lack of good faith in bargaining. Rabouin v.
NLRB, 195 F.2d 906 (2d Cir. 1952), enforcing 87 N.L.R.B. 972 (1949) (de-
n-and by union of performance bond by employer); NLRB v. Dalton Tel
Co., 187 F.2d 811 (5th Cir. 1951) (employer demand that union register under
state statute); American Radio Ass'n, CIO, supra (union demand for union
hiring hall); NLRB v. Aladdin Industries, Inc., 125 F.2d 377 (7th Cir.),
cert. denied, 316 U.S. 706 (1942) (union demanded discharge of forewoman).
7. Cox and Dunlop, supra note 6. But see Findling and Colby, Regulation of
Collective Bargaining by the National Labor Relations Board-Another View,
51 COLum. L. Rv. 170 (1951).
8. NLRB v. J. H. Allison & Co., 165 F.2d 766 (6th Cir.), cert. denied, 335 U.S.
814 (1948).
9. See. e.g.. John W. Bolton & Sons, Inc.. 91 N.L.R.B. 989 (1950) (incentive
wages); West Boylston Mfg. Co., 87 N.L.R.B. 808 (1949) (recall of employees);
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seems to be that an employer, by section 8 (a) (5) of the act, is under
a duty to bargain about the subjects covered by section 9 (a). There-
fore, the Board has found it necessary and desirable, in order to deter-
mine in a specific case whether a refusal to bargain about a particular
item is a breach of this duty, first to ascertain whether the subject is
one properly cognizable under the terms of section 9 (a). If it is, then
the employer's unilateral action concerning this item and his duty to
bargain will be considered in deciding whether an unfair labor practice
has been committed.
It should be noted in passing that the disposition of the Board and
the courts to delineate mandatory bargaining subjects perhaps tends
to affect the substantive terms of collective bargaining agreements.
Such a result may be anticipated when the employees' representative
feels that its function has not been adequately executed unless there
has in fact been discussion of all the mandatory subjects. The problems
connected with an employer's unilateral action after a collective agree-
ment has been signed are more likely to occur when the scope of the
bargaining negotiations has not been encyclopedic. When the em-
ployment conditions have been fully considered during negotiations
and functions delegated either to management exclusively, to joint
determination by management and union, or to union control, the
probability of unfair labor practice charges because of unilateral ac-
tion is greatly reduced. However, such expansive negotiations are
all too often either impractical or impracticable at the time, and so,
like the poor, the problems are always with us.
If the premise that the act is designed to foster collective bargaining
is accepted, the exercise of unilateral action might well be precluded
by implication, for obviously the concepts of unilateral action and
collective bargaining are fundamentally inconsistent. 10 Certainly it is
not surprising that in an area where collective bargaining is thought
to be the desideratum, unilateral action is regarded as somewhat
suspect." If the duty to bargain collectively were absolute, existing
at all times in every employment situation where a union has been
Weyerhaeuser Timber Co., 87 N.L.R.B. 672 (1949) (board); Massey Gin &
Mach. Works, Inc., 78 N.L.R.B. 189 (1948) (shift schedules); Southshore
Packing Corp., 73 N.L.R.B. 1116 (1947) (piece rates); Woodside Cotton Mills
Co., 21 N.L.R.B. 42 (1940) (work loads). Also see Note, Proper Subjects
for Collective Bargaining: Ad Hoc v. Predictive Definition, 58 YALE L.J. 803
(1949).
10. "It has been shown that the effort to exclude portions of the incidents
of business ownership from the regime of collective bargaining has been
miscalculated. The reservation of unilateral rights by employers is unsuited
to collective bargaining. Nor is it possible to define, with any degree of logic,
or any quality of permanence, areas in which collective bargaining shall
or shall not be permitted to intrude. The question is one of allocation of
functions in a management-union relationship, not one of reservation of
rights." TELLER, MANAGEMENT FuNCTIONS UNDER CoLLEcTIVE BARGAINING 383
(1947).




designated by the employees to bargain for them, then unilateral ac-
tion would indeed be eliminated as a lawful method of establishing
wages, hours, and other terms and conditions of employment. How-
ever, the philosophical foundation of collective bargaining demon-
strates that it is a means toward an end rather than an end per se.
Collective bargaining, as has been indicated, developed as a method
of counteracting an employer's almost complete control over employ-
ment conditions. Through it, bargaining power is conceivably
equated. 12 With such power, the probability of establishing employ-
ment conditions through mutual agreement between labor and man-
agement is increased, 13 thereby giving employees a sense of real
participation in creating the benefits and obligations constituting their
employment. Thus, the unrest ensuing from an imbalance of bar-
gaining power may be alleviated.
But the act is not designed as a panacea. It has merely indicated
the procedure whereby, under certain circumstances-i.e., when a
collective bargaining representative has been designated in an appro-
priate bargaining unit-employers and employees are to decide on a
contract of employment. The parties to the bargaining negotiations
are encouraged, not required, to reach agreement. 14 They need not
agree to a proposal or make a concession. 15 Strikes and other forms of
concerted activity may result from a lack of agreement as a private
method of *exercising economic power to induce acquiescence on re-
quested employment conditions.
The constitutionality of the act was upheld in NLRB v. Jones &
Laughlin Steel Corporation.6 The Supreme Court of the United
States, speaking through Chief Justice Hughes, referred to its con-
struction of the Railway Labor Act in expressing an opinion on the
duty to bargain imposed by the National Labor Relations Act, and
inferentially on the allowable scope for unilateral action, by saying:
It [the Railway Labor Act] was taken "to prohibit the negotiation of
labor contracts generally applicable to employees" in the described unit
with any other representative than the one so chosen, "but not as
precluding such individual contracts" as the Company might "elect to
make directly with individual employees." We think this construction
also applies to § 9(a) of the National Labo Relations Act.
The Act does not compel agreements between employers and employees.
It does not compel any agreement whatever. It does not prevent the
employer "from refusing to make a collective contract and hiring in-
dividuals on whatever terms" the employer "may by unilateral action
determine."'7
12. But see Note, Improvement in Terms of Employment as an unfair Labor
Practice, 54 HARv. L. REV. 1036 (1941).
13. Shulman, Reason, Contract, and Law in Labor Relations, 68 HARV. L.
REv. 999, 1000 (1955).
14. NLRB v. Jones & Laughlin Steel Corp., 301 U.S. 1, 45 (1937).
15. 61 STAT. 140 (1947), 29 U.S.C.A. § 158(d) (Supp. 1955).
16. 301 U.S. 1 (1937).
17. Id. at 45.
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This language, if literally followed, could have caused a materially
different evolution of the law with respect to the scope allowed by the
act for collective bargaining and for unilateral action.18 The trend
was not in accordance with the view expressed, and this construction
was rejected when the Court in a later case-held that individual
employment contracts must yield to collective agreements once a
representative has been designated and bargaining requested.
The Court said in J. I. Case19 that in Jones & Laughlin.it had:
recognized the existence of some scope for individual contracts, but it did
not undertake to define it or to consider the relations between lawful
individual and collective agreements, which is the problem now before
US.
Care has been taken in the opinions of the Court to reserve a field for
the individual contract, even in industries covered .by'the National Labor
Relations Act, not merely as an act or evidence of hiring, but also in the
sense of a completely individually bargained contract setting out terms
of employment, because there are circumstances in which it may legally
be used, in fact, in which there is no alternative. Without limiting the
possibilities, instances such as the following will occur: Men may
continue work after a collective agreement expires and, despite negotia-
tion in good faith, the negotiation may be deadlocked or delayed; in the
interim express or implied individual agreements may. be held to govern.
The conditions for collective bargaining may not exist; thus a majority
of the employees may refuse to join a union or to agree upon or designate
bargaining representatives, or the majority may not be demonstrable by
the means prescribed by the statute, or a previously ,existent majority
may have been lost without unlawful interference by the employer and
no new majority have been formed. As the employer in these circum-
stances may be under no legal obligation to bargain collectively, he may
be free to enter into individual contracts.20
This expression of opinion may be regarded as the foundation for many
of the rules connected with strikes and impasses.
The attitude with which the Board approaches the problems con-
nected with unilateral action after a union has been designated for
collective bargaining may be gleaned from the following statements
from its Annual Reports. In speaking of the applicability of section
8 (a) (1), the Board said:
Unilateral action by an employer when the employees have a bargaining
representative is another form of unlawful interference with employees'
collective bargaining activities which violates the section of the act.21
18. See Ward, The Mechanics of Collective Bargaining, 53 HARv. L. REV.
754, 788 (1940), for a discussion of the proposition that individual employment
contracts were an alternative to collective agreements and that any other
result would be unconstitutional.
19. J. I. Case Co. v. NLRB, 321 U.S. 332 (1944).
20. Id. at 336-37.
21. 16 NLRB ANN. REP. 149 (1951).
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But in addition 'to being interference, restraint, or coercion, uni-
lateral action may be illicit under the duty to bargain in good faith
created in section 8 (a) (5) of the act. The Board has proclaimed:
If there is a duly designated bargaining representative of the employees,
an employer also violates his obligation to bargain by unilaterally
changing current terms and conditions of employment without prior
consultation with that representative.22
Though ringing, these denunciations, like most general statements of
law, seem to have exceptions and may not be literally applied to every
factual situation. The cases indicate that variations have been played
on the theme.23
Congress created the employer's duty to bargain with his employees
when they so desire, but it left to the employees the choice of whether
or not to organize for bargaining and therefore whether the duty
would or would not initially be imposed. In a given case, there can
be no breach of the duty unless the duty exists.2 4 The Board has
succinctly stated the prerequisites for the temporal genesis of the duty
by saying:
Whenever it is alleged that an employer has violated section 8(a) (5),
the complaining union must show not only that it is the majority repre-
sentative of the employees concerned but also that it has requested the
employer to enter into bargaining negotiations. The request to bargain
-need not be formal, nor made in any particular manner. It is sufficient
that the employer is clearly aware of the employees' desire to enter into
negotiations through the designated bargaining agent.25
It is only necessary to add here that a good faith doubt as to the
union's status as majority representative will postpone the duty to
bargain until the question has been resolved.26 This result is necessary
because employees are free to organize for bargaining or not, as they
choose; and the Board, not the employer, is authorized to determine
the status of the union and the appropriateness of the unit.2 7 Erron-
eous or premature recognition and bargaining are not tolerated be-
cause of sections 8 (a) (1) and (2).28
22. 14 NLRB ANN. REP. 75 (1949).
23. Phelps Dodge Copper Products Corp., 101 N.L.R.B. 360 (1952) (no
duty to bargain during a slowdown); United Elastic Corp., 84 N.L.R.B. 768
(1949) (strike in violation of contract); Montgomery Ward & Co., 39 N.L.R.B.
229 (1942) (bargaining negotiations in "suspension" so no duty to withhold
normal action).
24. NLRB v. Reeder Motor Co., 202 F.2d 802 (6th Cir. 1953).
25. 15 NLRB ANN. REP. 119 (1949). Also see May Dep't Stores Co, v.
NLRB, 326 U.S. 376 (1945); Franks Bros. Co. v. NLRB, 321 U.S. 702 (1944);
Medo Photo Supply Corp. v. NLRB, 321 U.S. 678 (1944); NLRB v. Columbian
Enameling & Stamping Co., 306 U.S. 292 (1939).
26. Texarkana Bus Co. v. NLRB, 119 F.2d 480 (8th Cir. 1941).
27. 49 STAT. 453 (1935), as amended, 29 U.S.C.A. § 159 (Supp. 1955).
28. Mandel Bros. Inc., 72 N.L.R.B. 859 (1947); Brashear Freight Lines Inc.,
13 N.L.R.B. 191 (1939).
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UNILATERAL ACTION PRIOR TO A COLLECTIVE BARGAINING AGREEMENT
Once a union has been selected and has requested bargaining,
unilateral action will occur, if at all, either before or after a collective
agreement has been negotiated. The first group of problems to be
considered will be those which may arise after a collective bargaining
representative has been designated but before a collective agreement
has been reached.
One group of cases seems to indicate that unilateral action is an
unfair labor practice per se after the duty to bargain has been created
but before a collective agreement has been concluded. Factually,
these cases fall into three patterns: either the employer refused to
recognize the union and to bargain at all; or he granted recognition to
the union but refused to discuss particular subjects of bargaining and
acted unilaterally on them; or, finally, recognition, bargaining, and
unilateral action, too, were all present. Though the factual situations
may vary, the Board's treatment does not when confronted by what it
regards as per se violations. In May Department Stores v. NLRB,29
a case coming within the first category factually and in which the em-
ployer refused to bargain in order to obtain judicial review of the
appropriateness of the bargaining unit, the employer unilaterally
requested permission from the War Labor Board to raise the wages of
all its employees. The Supreme Court, in upholding the Board's
finding of interference and a refusal to bargain, expressed the general
philosophy concerning unilateral action under these circumstances by
saying:
Employer action to bring about changes in wage scales without consulta-
tion and negotiation with the certified representative of its employees
cannot, we think, logically or realistically, be distinguished from bargain-
ing with individuals or minorities ... He... proposed that he, as employer,
would make the increase .... By going ahead with wage adjustments
without negotiating with the bargaining agent, it took a step which
justified the conclusion of the Board as to the violation of § 8(1). Such
unilateral action minimizes the influence of organized bargaining. It
interferes with the right of self-organization by emphasizing to the
employees that there is no necessity for a collective bargaining agent.0
The employer's motive in refusing to recognize the union is not
always to contest the appropriateness of the bargaining unit.31 In
fact, that type of situation seems to be the exception rather than the
rule. More often, the motive is found to be a desire to be free from the
union and the restrictions imposed on the employer's conduct. Though
unilateral action is condemned, it should also be perfectly plain that
simply by refusing to recognize the union and to honor its request to
bargain, the employer has violated sections 8 (a) (1) and (5) if the
29. 326 U.S. 376 (1945).
30. Id. at 384-85.
31. See, e.g., Star Beef Co., 92 N.L.R.B. 1018 (1950).
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unit, is appropriate and the union is majority representative.32 Thus,
his additional action with respect to bargainable subjects is merely a
compounding of the original delict. The duty to bargain ordinarily
does not arise until a request is made, and the Board has adopted a
rather cavalier attitude in finding such requests once a union has
obtained majority representation. 33 The request need not be formal
or made in any particular way through any particular media.34
Cases involving the so-called per se violations during collective
bargaining or when such negotiations are pending best illustrate the
Board's attitude toward the fait accompli.35 One employer committed
per se 8(a) (1) and (5) violations during negotiations by raising the
minimum wages of his employees in order to comply with federal
law.36 The union was not consulted about the matter, and the Board
said, "it is not the granting of a wage increase, but the unilateral
action which is violative of the National Labor Relations Act."37
Before a collective agreement is signed, employer changes in employ-
ment conditions present a union with grievous problems at the bar-
gaining table since they may be unexpected or difficult to change under
the circumstances. Therefore, when the union requests bargaining,
the employer's freedom to change employment conditions is virtually
prohibited unless the union is first consulted.
Not only may unilateral action on topics about which bargaining is
pending by unlawful per se, but also such action on topics under dis-
cussion during bargaining may be.3 8 In addition, changes of conditions
not discussed at bargaining conferences have been held to be unfair
per se.39 The effect of these rulings is to promote discussion of con-
templated changes and to encourage collective agreements. On the
other hand, these rules, by confusing negotiations, might hamper bar-
gaining more than helping. If every proposal for a temporary change
were discussed along with proposals for a written agreement to govern
future conditions, negotiations could become so involved with current
32. Franks Bros. Co. v. NLRB, 321 U.S. 702 (1944).
33. NLRB v. Burke Mach. Tool Co., 133 F.2d 618 (6th Cir. 1943); Burton-
Dixie Corp., 103 N.L.R.B. 880 (1953); Lingerie, Inc., 101 N.L.R.B. 1374 (1952);
Joy Silk Mills, Inc., 85 N.L.R.B. 1263 (1949).
34. 15 NLRB ANx. REP. 119 (1949).
35. "One further requirement developed by the Board seems to partake
more of the nature of a hard and fast rule of bargaining procedure than of a
standard or of mere evidence of absence of good faith bargaining.... The rule
against fait accomplis generally serves as the basis for a holding that an em-
ployer refused to bargain by adopting a wage-cut without notice to or dis-
cussion with the union during the course of negotiations which included
the subject of wages, but has been applied also in the case of changes in
hours of employment." Ward, The Mechanics of Collective Bargaining, 53
HA.v. L. REv. 754, 769-70 (1940).
36. Union Mfg. Co., 95 N.L.R.B. 792 (1951).
37. Id. at 793 n.5.
38. Allen-Morrison Sign Co., 79 N.L.R.B. 904 (1948); Southshore Packing
Corp., 73 N.L.R.B. 1116 (1947).
39. See, e.g., I.B.S. Mfg. Co. 96 N.L.R.B. 1263 (1951).
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adjustments that agreement on general terms for the future could be
delayed for a considerable period. That the possible advantages are
considered to outweigh possible disadvantages is demonstrated by the
cases in which the problems are considered.
In another' case deserving mention here,40 the employer, a radio
station, refused to recognize the union representing its transmission
station operators because the bargaining unit was regarded as inap-
propriate. The union subsequently lost its majority status because
of personnel changes resulting from normal business operations. Sec-
tion 8(a) (1) charges were dismissed, but the Board ruled that the
unilateral personnel changes violated section 8 (a) (5) and, to effectuate
the purposes of the act, ordered the employer to bargain with the
union. The order would have been quite ordinary in the usual case,
but enforcement was refused on the ground that the order to bargain
would in no way effectuate the purposes of the act. The Board
apparently had argued in part that the change in conditions resulted
from the unfair practices connected with the unilateral action. The
court rejected this argument in the following words:
The changes might indeed have become the subject of collective bargaining
but it cannot be said than an employer may not make any valid change
in the working conditions or personnel of his employees without con-
sulting the union selected by its employees to represent them. In this
instance the changes were made in the normal course of business, gave
rise to no dispute between the management and the men, and provoked
no adverse criticism from the Board.41
There may or may not be a quarrel with the ultimate decision of the
court in the case, but the court's view of what an employer can do is
somewhat surprising since the Board had been adamantly maintaining
more or less the opposite position. Quite recently the Board's order
was enforced in a case in which an employer unilaterally abolished
the customary rest periods of the employees.42 The action was re-
garded as the equivalent of individual bargaining and hence unlawful
under the circumstances.
In most cases where specific, conduct was held to violate statutory
duties per se, other manifestations of an intention to avoid collective
bargaining if at all possible were present. These indicia of employer
attitude ranged from the so-called per se violations to circulation of
anti-union petitions, discharges, and other misguided measures cal-
culated to defeat employee intent to bargain through a group repre-
sentative.43 If these cases represented the sole treatment of unilateral
40. NLRB v. Inter-City Advertising Co., 154 F.2d 244 (4th Cir. 1946).
41. Id. at 247.
42. Fry Roofing Co. v, NLRB, 216 F.2d 273 (9th Cir. 1954).
43. NLRB v. Harris, 200 F.2d 656 (5th Cir. 1953) (refusal to tell union
whether employer would comply wih federal minimum wage statute);
Central Metallic Casket Co., 91 N.L.R.B. 572 (1950) (discharges for refusals
1956 ]
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action during bargaining negotiations, the lesson to be learned would
be short and simple: it is a breach of the duty to bargain collectively
for an employer to make unilateral adjustments in employment con-
ditions while bargaining negotiations with the designated representa-
tive of his employees are either pending or progressing.
However, not every instance of unilateral action in these circum-
stances has been condemned per se, at least, not in so many words. In
a number of cases, the Board has, so to speak, thrown the unilateral
action into a hopper along with a totality of conduct and announced
that both interference with the exercise of section 7 rights and a
failure to bargain in good faith had occurred.44 These m i g h t be
dubbed the "course-of-conduct" cases. The condemned action may
have taken the form of a raise in wages,45 a reduction in the length of
the work week with an increase in production rates in piecework
(in effect, giving the employees a raise),46 or making usual and
habitual semi-annual wage adjustments, 47 or meeting general wage
increases in the area.48 Though one might think this enough in itself
to justify finding an 8 (a) (5) violation, the unilateral action was con-
sidered in conjunction with other employer behavior as evidence of
bad faith in bargaining, and hence, an unfair labor practice. Unilateral
action was usually mentioned more or less in passing, while the other
details of the cases were stressed at some length, both by the Board
and by the courts. Such course-of-conduct consideration may be ex-
plained by considering an employer's defense to the charge of having
violated section 8 (a) (5). He would stoutly maintain that he had in
fact been bargaining and that that would preclude a finding of a re-
fusal to bargain. However, the test of collective bargaining has long
been a standard of good faith, a test involving an employer's state of
mind during negotiations. In connection with unilateral action, the
Board has stated its conception of good faith bargaining by saying:
to sign individual employment contracts); Long-Lewis Hardware Co., 90
N.L.R.B. 1403 (1950) (anti-union speech, interrogations concerning union
membership, individual contracts demanded after union request for bargain-
ing, and anti-union petitions); Montgomery Ward & Co., 90 N.L.R.B. 1244
(1950) (changes instituted without sufficient notice to union, information on
merit increases withheld from union); West Fork Cut Glass Co., 90 N.L.R.B.
944 (1950) (unjustified assertion of doubt of union's majority status during
certification year); Anchor Rome Mills, Inc., 86 N.L.R.B. 1120 (1949) (em-
ployer obtained pistol licenses for supervisors during strike); Mason & Hughes,
Inc., 86 N.L.R.B. 848 (1949) (continued postponement of bargaining con-
ferences); Allen-Morrison Sign Co., 79 N.L.R.B. 904 (1948) (no-solicitation
rule announced, anti-union petition.)
44. See, e.g., V-O Milling Co., 43 N.L.R.B. 348 (1942); George P. Pilling &
Son Co., 16 N.L.R.B. 650 (1939), enforcement granted, 119 F.2d 32 (3d Cir.
1941.)
45. Standard Generator Serv. Co., 90 N.L.R.B. 790 (1950).
46. George P. Pilling & Son Co., 16 N.L.R.B. 650 (1939), enforcement
granted, 119 F.2d (3d Cir. 1941).
47. V-O Milling Co., 43 N.L.R.B. 348 (1942).
48. Tower Hosiery Mills, Inc., 81 N.L.R.B. 658 (1949), enforcement granted,
180 F.2d 701 (4th Cir.), cert. denied, 340 U.S. 811 (1950).
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We have held that when an employer unilaterally grants concessions to
his employees, at a time when their designated union is attempting to
bargain concerning the same subject matter, such action constitutes a
violation of the employer's duty to bargain with the accredited union ....
It is clear that ... [unilateral action], under such circumstances, would
have the effect of indicating to employees that they could obtain better
conditions directly from their employer without the aid of the union... .49
Thus does the Labor Board excoriate unilateral action. This then is
why unilateral action is invidious, and therefore is the opprobrium
attached. Unilateral action is insidious. It may tend to undermine
the prestige of the union in the eyes of the employees. Conceivably,
the disparagement may have one of two effects. First, the employees
may lose interest in the union and withdraw their support. Then the
employer would become omnipotent again. Second, the employees
might be quite union-oriented and become so outraged as to interrupt
the free flow of interstate commerce. Since the act is avowed to be
for the purpose of encouraging the free flow of such commerce, either
of the above possibilities would be inimical to this declaration of
congressional intent. This, perhaps, explains the Board's suspicion
of unilateral action. The employer's power to exercise unilateral ac-
tion had largely contributed to the promulgation of the act. It was
designed to protect and encourage organization for bargaining collec-
tively and to establish the procedure of collective bargaining when
employees desired it.50 "Unilateral action" is simply a symbol meaning
"individual bargaining between employer and employee" in this con-
text. Thus, the concepts of collective bargaining and unilateral ac-
tion are, in this sense, inconsistent.
It has been eloquently argued that the act was intended to protect
organizational activity on the part of employees for the purpose of
collective bargaining and that once organized, bargaining would take
place as a matter of course.5 ' If this were so, unilateral action would
indeed be proscribed whenever and wherever it would frustrate
organizational activity or undermine an established collective organiza-
tion. If unilateral action would have neither effect in the circumstances
of its exercise, then the reason for the proscription would be lacking.
Thus, under accepted principles, if the reason for a rule does not exist,
the rule is inapplicable.
However, through the administration of the act, the thesis was
developed that collective bargaining itself was an objective of the
act, perhaps even the objective.52 Congress included the duty to
49. George P. Pilling & Son Co., 16 N.L.R.B. 650, 658-59 (1939), enforce-
ment granted, 119 F.2d 32 (3d Cir. 1941).
50. Developments in the Law-The Taft-Hartley Act, 64 HARV. L. REV.
781 (1951).
51. Cox and Dunlop, Regulation of Collective Bargaining by the National
Labor Relations Board, 63 HARv. L. REV. 389 (1950).
52. Note, Improvement in Terms of Employment as an Unfair Labor
Practice, 54 HARV. L. REv. 1036 (1941).
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bargain collectively in the duties imposed on an employer more or
less as an afterthought. 53 The duty was added rather as a legal
catalyst. If an employer were free, at his pleasure, to recognize or
not his employees' designated bargaining agent, the exercise of the
right to organize would be futile. The duty to bargain precludes such
a result. Hence, organizational activities on the part of employees and
the designation of a bargaining agent have been treated as but steps
in a process leading to collective bargaining and the establishment
of employment conditions through the mutual assent of the employer
and his united employees.
Congress considered collective bargaining and found it good. Among
its advantages are usefulness in making employees feel secure in their
jobs and its possibilities for reducing the interruptions of commerce
erupting from disputes over employment conditions. In order, then,
to protect and promote commerce, the duty of an employer to bargain
collectively was created by statute. As stated in section 1 of the act:
It is hereby declared to be the policy of the United States to eliminate the
causes of certain substantial obstructions to the free flow of commerce
and to mitigate and eliminate these obstructions when they have occurred
by encouraging the practice and procedure of collective bargaining and
by protecting the exercise by workers of full freedom of association, self-
organization, and designation of representatives of their own choosing,
for the purpose of negotiating the terms and conditions of their employ-
ment or other mutual aid or protection.54
Since this is the policy of the nation, it should be considered in the
interpretation and administration of the act lest the policy be
thwarted.
Rational Application of the Duty to Bargain Collectively. Employ-
ment is created by, and the obligations of employer and employees
rest upon, a contract; and bargaining is the essence of a contract. In
creating employment contracts, two types of bargaining, individual
and collective, have been utilized. The act is designed to promote the
latter. However, if in the circumstances of a particular case, collective
bargaining would not be necessary to "eliminate the causes of certain
substantial obstructions to the free flow of commerce" or "to mitigate
and eliminate these obstructions when they have occurred," it would
appear that individual bargaining, i.e., unilateral action, would be
permissible provided further that it would not interfere with the
protection of the rights of the employees to organize collectively.
In summary, the duty to bargain collectively should be imposed in
every case in which collective bargaining alone would tend to accom-
plish the public policy expressed by the act, but otherwise either type
of bargaining should be permitted.
53. Smith, Evolution of the "Duty to Bargain" Concept in American Law,
39 McH. L. REv. 1065 (1941).
54. 61 STAT. 137, 29 U.S.C.A. § 151 (1947).
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The danger created by unilateral action when there is a duty to
bargain collectively, as the Board has indicated again and again,
is that it will subvert the designated representative. 55 This being taken
as true, unilateral action would not appear to be a breach of the duty if
the danger did not or would not tend to come to pass. Thus, in the
Western Printing Company case,5 6 the Board refused to find inter-
ference and a failure to bargain in good faith when an employer
unilaterally changed the length of the work week and granted a pay
raise to all employees while negotiating with a union for a contract.
On its face, this would appear to be per se an unfair practice. How-
ever, the union represented only a fraction of the employees involved,
the prior negotiations had been in good faith, and bargaining about
the changes was had when the union protested them. The Board
found that neither union membership nor collective bargaining had
been affected and that this did not indicate bad faith in bargaining
under all the circumstances. Thus, the intent of the employer in
acting and the effect of the action were considered. Generally, uni-
lateral action would probably have some effect adverse to the union
and to collective bargaining. It would seem then that if no effect could
be demonstrated or inferred, no basis for finding an unfair labor
practice would exist. The Board recognized this in the Western
Printing case and therefore properly dismissed the charges.
A court applied the suggested line of reasoning when it denied
enforcement of the Board's order in the Bradley Washfountain case.57
The employer denied the union's requests for improved employment
conditions and then unilaterally instituted almost everything the
union had requested, but the union never protested the changes. A
strike followed the changes; the strikers were replaced; and the com-
pany refused to recognize the union. The court was unable to agree
with the Board that an unfair practice had caused the strike and that
the employer should therefore bargain with the union. The union had
not been disparaged and the improvements had resulted from its
requests during bargaining negotiations. The past history of bargain-
ing relations was considered as part of the context in which this
unilateral action was taken. However, one may or may not agree
with the extent of the court's review of the Board's order. The Board
is supposed to be the expert body to weigh evidence and draw infer-
ences, and its findings should be sustained if supported by substantial
evidence on the record considered as a whole.5
55. See, e.g., Reed & Prince Mfg. Co., 96 N.L.RB. 850 (1951), enforcement
granted, 205 F.2d 131 (1st Cir.), cert. denied, 346 U.S. 887 (1953).
56. Sam M. Jackson, 34 N.L.R.B. 194 (1941).
57. NLRB v. Bradley Washfountain Co., 192 F.2d 144 (7th Cir. 1951), 65
HARv. L. Rnv. 697 (1952).
58. 48 STAT. 926 (1934), as amended, 29 U.S.C.A. § 160(c) (1947), as
amended, 29 U.S.C.A. § 160 (c) (Supp. 1955); Universal Camera Corp. v. NLRB,
340 U.S. 474 (1951).
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A suggestion has been made that in the Bradley case the Board was
announcing a policy that unilateral action on a subject of collective
bargaining, in the absence of an impasse, is presumptively a refusal to
bargain and that the court should have considered this before reversing
the Board's ruling.5 9 The Board does, in fact, appear to have been
espousing a concept of collective bargaining which requires at least
notice to the union before a change is made in wages, hours or other
terms and conditions of employment before a collective agreement has
been signed. However, if after a reasonable period has elapsed, the
union has expressed no interest in the matter, the employer should be
able to institute the change.60 This, it might be noted, would not be
unilateral action in its usual sense because the union would have had
a chance to challenge the change. By not doing so, it could be said to
have lent its sanction to the change. Finally, by requiring consulta-
tion with the union before an employer acts on subjects or bargaining,
the Board may indirectly be encouraging the parties to come to an
agreement more rapidly than they otherwise might.
UNILATERAL ACTION AND AN IMPASSE IN BARGAINING
Bargaining negotiations may have been undertaken with the best
possible intentions of reaching an agreement, but because of conflicting
views between the employer and the union, the parties may reach a
point where neither is willing to recede from a position. Since neither
party need make any concessions, a stalemate is created. Even though
this happens, the necessity for conducting the employer's business
continues. If he could take no action at all without the consent of the
union and this consent could not be obtained, the business would
suffer. Too, continued conferences would be futile if both parties
were honestly adamant. Time or subsequent events might serve to
change the situation or the attitudes of those involved in the bargain-
ing. Accordingly, the Board has held that when an impasse has been
reached in negotiations, the employer may take unilateral action and
institute the changes he proposed to the extent that they were offered
to the union.61 The necessity for the limitation is obvious. If the
employer had offered the union more than he offered the employees
after the impasse, the stalemate might not have occurred. Moreover,
a direct offer to the employees of more than was offered to the union
would indicate a lack of good faith in bargaining since he should have
been as willing to give it through bargaining as through his own action
in dealing directly with the employees.
62
59. 65 HARv. L. REV. 697 (1952).
60. Cf. Montgomery Ward & Co., 90 N.L.R.B. 1244 (1950).
61. I.B.S. 1fg. Co., 96 N.L.R.B. 1263 (1951); W. W. Cross & Co., 77 N.L.R.B.
1162 (1948).
62. NLRB v. Crompton-Highland Mills, Inc., 337 U.S. 217 (1949).
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The impasse must have resurted from good faith bargaining before
unilateral action will be tolerated. If an impasse were created because
of bad faith bargaining by the employer, his subsequent unilateral
action would be a violation of the duty to bargain.63 Otherwise, an
employer could appear to be bargaining without in fact having a
willingness to reach an agreement; an impasse could result; and he
would be able to exercise unilateral action. Thus, the duty to bargain
could be readily circumvented. An impasse is quite commonly
pleaded when unilateral action has been exercised after bargaining,
but the Board has been none too ready to find that one existed unless
it is clear that the attitudes of the negotiators had hardened to the
extent that further talks would have availed nothing. If either side
indicates a willingness to alter its assumed position, then an impasse
has not developed.
The duty to bargain exists during an impasse but is in abeyance and
anything which indicates that further negotiations might result in an
agreement will dissolve it. Thereupon the duty to bargain becomes
operative again and the normal rules concerning unilateral action
during negotiations apply. A strike is another way of breaking an
impasse.64 The economic pressure on both employer and employees
during each day that a strike continues would tend to cause both to
be more anxious to find a mutually agreeable ground for settlement
of their dispute. However, if the strike results from a valid impasse,
the employer is free to replace the strikers in order to carry on his
business.65 In doing so, he may offer the replacements permanent
positions of employment and the same wages, hours, and other terms
and conditions that he had previously offered the union.66 The offer
may not exceed the one made to the union though it need not be as
generous. 67 The offer to the union sets the maximum. Presumably
the employer could offer less than was suggested to the union though
some difficulty may be encountered in determining whether what the
employer offers as a result of the impasse is better than the offer to
the union. This is a matter to be determined on the basis of the
available evidence. That administrators and jurists might reach
differing conclusions here is within the realm of possibility.6 8 How-
ever, this is a problem connected with the scope of judicial review, not
with the theory permitting unilateral action during a bargaining
impasse. As a practical matter, except in an area where unemploy-
63. NLRB v. Andrew Jergens Co., 175 F.2d 130 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 338
U.S. 827 (1949).
64. West Fork Cut Glass Co., 90 N.L.R.B. 944 (1950).
65. The Texas Co., 93 N.L.R.B. 1358 (1951); Augusta Bedding Co., 93
N.L.R.B. 211 (1951).
66. Pacific Gamble Robinson Co., v. NLRB, 186 F.2d 106 (6th Cir. 1950).
67. NLRB v. Crompton-Highland Mills, Inc., 337 U.S. 217 (1949).
68. Pacific Gamble Robinson Co. v. NLRB, 186 F.2d 106 (6th Cir. 1950).
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ment is rampant, it is improbable that a full labor force to replace
the strikers could be obtained, particularly if the latter would not
work for what was offered.
An argument could be made that the fact that an impasse has been
reached is all the more reason for the negotiators to cast about for
possible ways of overcoming what appears to be an insuperable ob-
stacle to agreement since experience has taught that solutions can be
found. If the employer could not take unilateral action in such
circumstances, the pressure to effect some change in employment condi-
tions might be great enough to cause the parties to find a basis for
agreement. This could take time. Meanwhile, the business could
continue with the employees employed, thereby serving the interests
of all.
The argument is not favored. The parties, by being able to withdraw
from the negotiations, might be able to reappraise the situation so as
to bargain in the future for a solution. Also, by allowing unilateral
action, some change might be effected and allowed to operate. If it
proved satisfactory despite prior opinions to the contrary, the problem
would then have resolved itself. If it did not, a change of conditions
might make later agreement possible. To preclude unilateral action
after an impasse would virtually be to force either the union or the
employer to agree to a proposal or to make a concession, a possibility
expressly excluded by section 8 (d) from the duty to bargain. As the
rule stands, it at least allows immediate action if the employer desires
it for the operation of the business. Certainly, if unilateral action
were not permissible in these circumstances and because of that it
became undesirable to continue the business, the interests of the
employees would not be served by an operational cessation. This is
not regarded as a probable result from a rule forbidding unilateral
action after an impasse, but it is a possible one and should be con-
sidered. The rule as it presently exists is a practical solution to a
practical problem.
The Duty to Bargain During an Impasse. To say that the duty to
bargain is suspended during an impasse is to say too much, or too
little. More precisely, the duty to bargain is suspended insofar as
matters which caused the impasse are concerned. As indicated, the
employer may change them unilaterally. The question arises as to
the duty to bargain about other employment conditions during an
impasse. The Board has answered that the duty is operative despite
an impasse over other issues.6 9 This, too, is meet. Simply because
agreement cannot be achieved on some of the proposed terms of a
collective bargaining agreement, the possibility of agreement over
69. I.B.S. Mfg. Co., 96 N.L.R.B. 1263 (1951); Central Metallic Casket Co.,
91 N.L.R.B. 572 (1950).
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other terms is not eliminated. To allow unrestricted unilateral action
when an impasse occurs would not necessarily tend to promote bar-
gaining. On the contrary, it could be argued that impasses would be
encouraged as far as employers are concerned. Collective agree-
ments are to be encouraged insofar as possible, and certainly this is an
area in which they are possible despite an impasse as to some items of a
suggested agreement. If the impasse were extended to the additional
items, that would be unfortunate. However, the parties should at-
tempt an agreement before loosing the employer from the bonds of
the collective bargaining duty.
STRIKES AND UNILATERAL AcTION
When peaceful negotiations fail, employees often resort to a private
form of economic warfare called "strike." The Board cannot compel
either a union or an employer to make a concession or to agree to a
proposed contractual term, but the private parties to the negotiations
are not so restricted. Strikes are a time-tested and onerous method
of compelling a reluctant employer to throw inhibition to the winds
and sign on the dotted line. This variety of concerted activity comes
in assorted types and sizes. A popular type is the plant-wide strike
in which all the employees in a plant leave their jobs to stop the
operation of the business. Another effective type is the departmental
strike where employees in one or more key departments walk out in
order to cripple or kill operations. There may also be "quickie"
strikes on a plant-wide or departmental basis in which the employees
involved stop working for a short period of time in protest over some-
thing which has aggrieved them. Another, an infamous, variation
is the slowdown, which is concerted action with a minimum of activity
involved. It is peculiarly designed to coerce management since the
employees stay on the job but exhibit extreme inertia. Insofar as
strikes affect the right to take unilateral action, the circumstances
which cause the strike are usually as important as the type of strike
itself.
Economic Strikes. An economic strike is designed to bring economic
pressure to bear on an employer in order to force him to accede to the
bargaining demands of a union, and the duty to bargain is operative
throughout. The employer may not condition bargaining on a return
of the employees to their jobs.70 If strikes had to be abandoned before
employers had to bargain, their power potential would be vitiated.
Economic strikes are legitimate as concerted activity for bargaining
purposes within the meaning and protection of section 7. Hence, to
70. West Coast Luggage Co., 105 N.L.R.B. 414 (1953).
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require the forfeiture of section 7 rights as prerequisite to negotiations
would constitute interference and a refusal to bargain.
Just as it is an overstatement to say that all's fair in love and war,
so it is with unilateral action during an economic strike, a labor war.
What has been said with respect to the scope of unilateral action after
an impasse is equally applicable to economic strikes. An employer
may attempt to replace the strikers in order to carry on his business
and may offer the replacements permanent jobs, including the condi-
tions offered the union, though the offer to the union must not be
exceeded.71 Also, employment conditions which the union has re-
jected must be offered to the general public rather than to the
individual strikers.7 2 The union represents the employees, and since
there is no suspension of the bargaining duty, to by-pass the union and
deal directly with the employees would interfere with concerted
activity and also breach the duty to bargain.3 Dealing with individual
employees would subject them to the very pressures which the act
is calculated to eliminate. Because a strike is war, in a sense, an
employer is allowed to fight, too, though his methods, like the em-
ployee's, are limited. In the battle to test economic and, bargaining
strength, the employees gamble with their jobs. If replacements can
be recruited in sufficient quantity to saturate the employer's require-
ments, the employees need not be replaced when the strike ends.7 4
In fact, the employer may be able to assert in good faith a doubt as to
the status of the union as majority representative of his employees.
His duty to bargain is then suspended until the position of the union
can be determined. 75 The result may be that the union no longer
represents a majority of the present employees in the unit, and the
employer will then be free to exercise unilateral action at his pleasure,
subject, of course, to the restrictions of section 8 (a) (1). This is true
even if the union had been certified by the Board as bargaining
representative for less than a year because an "exceptional circum-
stance" would be present.7 6 As has been said before, for an employer
to fill all the positions left by strikers would be exceptional unless the
labor market contained an excess which could provide a sufficiently
skilled group to meet the requirements of the business. Also, it is
probable that the striking employees would make the necessary un-
conditional offer to return to work and thereby end the strike before
all had been replaced. At the termination of the strike, the employer
71. NLRB v. Crompton-Highland Mills, Inc., 337 U.S. 217 (1949); Pacific
Gamble Robinson Co. v. NLRB, 186 F.2d 106 (6th Cir. 1950).
72. Pacific Gamble Robinson Co. v. NLRB, 186 F.2d 106 (6th Cir. 1950).
73. National Gas Co., 99 N.L.R.B. 273 (1952).
74. Texas Foundries, Inc. v. NLRB, 211 F.2d 791 (5th Cir. 1954); Penokee
Veneer Co., 74 N.L.R.B. 1683 (1947).
75. National Carbon Div., Union Carbide and Carbon Corp., 104 N.L.R.B.
416 (1953).
76. NLRB v. Sands Mfg. Co., 306 U.S. 332 (1939).
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must offer the remaining jobs to the strikers as they do not lose their
status as "employees" because of the strike. Discrimination in return-
ing the strikers to the jobs would be an unfair practice under section
8 (a) (3).71
"Unprotected" Strikes. The strike story is not yet complete. Not
every strike or concerted activity is within the protection offered by
section 7, with the resulting affects on the scope of unilateral- action.
Some types of employee activity are not considered justified or justifi-
able even though they may be both "concerted" and "activity." There-
fore, when they occur, they are not treated as "concerted activity"
within the meaning of section 7. Employees, for one reason or
another, may be too impatient to await the results of bargaining
negotiations; they have desires and want them sated now. Again, they
may not wish to incur the inconveniences attendant on protracted
strike activity of the usual sort. Hence, activities designed to bring
an employer to heel more swiftly than might otherwise be the case
may be utilized. Their demands may be within the compass of
"wages, hours, and other terms and conditions of employment" but
the means whereby the ends are sought may be outside the law and
frowned on by society, as personified by the Board and the courts.
A sit-down strike is an unprotected means for gaining an end.78 The
employees take possession of the employer's physical premises and
refuse to admit him or to allow work to continue until their demands
are met. Slowdowns have already been mentioned and are included
in this area of activity.79 Strikes for short periods of time with
threats of repetitions80 and strikes in violation of no-strike clauses in
collective agreements 8' have also been resorted to. These are not
necessarily all the possible types of activity which will be accorded
the same treatment by the Board. From time to time additional
techniques which will be included may be developed through the
ingenuity of man.
In another line of cases, the Board has developed the doctrine that
even though the means employed to assert bargaining demands are
legitimate in themselves, the ends may not be.82 Thus, where em-
77. NLRB v. Mackay Radio & Tel. Co., 304 U.S. 333 (1938).
78. NLRB v. Fansteel Metallurgical Corp., 306 U.S. 240 (1939).
79. Valley City Furniture Co., 110 N.L.R.B. 1589 (1954) (partial strike by
refusal to work overtime); Phelps Dodge Copper Products Corp., 101 N.L.R.B.
360 (1952) (slowdown).
80. Valley City Furniture Co., 110 N.L.R.B. 1589 (1954) (one-hour strike
with threats of repetition).
81. NLRB v. Columbian Enameling & Stamping Co., 306 U.S. 292 (1939);
Dorsey Trailers, Inc., 80 N.L.R.B. 478 (1948), enforced as modified, 179 F.2d
589 (5th Cir. 1950).
82. See, e.g., The American News Co., 55 N.L.R.B. 1302 (1944). Also see
NLRB v. National Maritime Union of America, 175 F.2d 686 (2d Cir. 1949)
(union advising strike to force employer to accept hiring hall); American
Radio Ass'n, CIO, 82 N.L.R.B. 1344 (1949) (threat to strike to enforce demand




ployees strike to compel an employer to accede to demands which
would'cause him to violate national or state laws, the objectives of
the strike are condemned. They are treated as if the means were
unlawful, and the protection of section 7 is not considered applicable.
It is unnecessary for present purposes to determine exactly when and
under what circumstances employee objectives will be considered
unprotected. Suffice it to say that when either the means or the ends
of employee activities are proscribed, the effects on the allowable area
for unilateral actions are the same.
It could be argued from the bald words of section 7 that all con-
certed employee activity is protected. The words alone certainly
lend themselves to that interpretation since no exception to the general
rule is indicated on the face of the statute. To say the same thing in a
different way, the statute imposes a duty on employers to bargain with
the representative of their employees. This is a public duty designed
to benefit the general populace by reducing the possibilities for in-
terruptions of interstate commerce because of labor disputes. When
employees engage inconcerted activities to gain their desired bargain-
ing ends, an employer increases the possibility of continuing an inter-
ruption of interstate commerce by refusing to talk to the union unless
the means and/or the ends are what are considered proper. It is
when they are "improper" that bargaining is unusually necessary in
order that the cause of the unrest may be eliminated and the employees
satisfied. Through collective bargaining, mutually satisfactory agree-
ments may be Concluded. If bargaining is not required in these cir-
cumstances until the employees conduct themselves with more pro-
priety, the very thing the act is intended to avoid will occur and the
industrial turmoil will tend to be prolonged. Therefore, public policy
demands that bargaining take place so as to restore commerce to its
accustomed and uninterrupted flow.
However, the act has not been so interpreted. The Board and the
courts have reasoned that means and ends which are not regarded as
proper are outside the scope of "concerted activities" protected by the
act.83 If section 7 is not applicable, there is no occasion for determining
whether an employer has committed an unfair labor practice as set
forth in section 8 (a). The explanation offered by the Board is that it
is impossible to determine an employer's good faith when employees
engage in improper activities.8 4 The crucial step is the determination
of the scope of section 7. With impunity, the employer may refuse to
talk to the union, but the immunity lasts only for the duration of the
83. NLRB v. Columbian Enameling & Stamping Co., 306 U.S. 292 (1939);
NLRB v. Fansteel Metallurgical Corp., 306 U.S. 240 (1939); NLRB v. Aladdin
Industries, Inc., 125 F.2d 377 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 316 U.S. 706 (1942).
84. Phelps Dodge Copper Products Corp., 101 N.L.R.B. 360 (1952).
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illicit behavior.8 5 If the employees reform, section 7 is revived with a
corresponding resurrection of section 8 (a).
During the unprotected activity, an employer is allowed to deal
directly with the employees. He may offer reinstatement with in-
creased wages, 86 or he may employ replacements to fill the vacancies
created by the strikers.87 If the prohibitions of section 8 (a) are
inapplicable, it follows that unilateral action may be exercised at will.
The position is not so extreme as it might at first appear. The
employees are engaged in activities which are not regarded as whole-
some or desirable. It is to the public interest that their conduct cease.
Interference, restraint, and coercion by the employer may well be
utilized to correct the situation. Little sympathy or protection is
needed for employees who behave in an anti-social manner. Employers
are required to reinstate with back pay employees who strike because
of unfair labor practices,88 except, of course, when the strike violates a
no-strike agreement.89 So, here, the employees may be forced to accept
the consequences of their activities. They take their jobs in their
hands when they behave in this fashion, and the power of the em-
ployer to act unilaterally or to discharge may have some deterrent
force. Hence, perhaps reasoned collective bargaining will be more
attractive than the -possible consequences of unlawful activity which
may be neither sure nor quick in forcing acquiescence to demands.
Again, this is a practical solution to a practical problem.
COLLECTIVE BARGAINING AGREEMENTS AND UNILATERAL ACTION
A collective bargaining agreement represents the fruition of the
collective bargaining process and is the immediate goal to be sought.
By the agreement, the parties, labor and management, establish-the
basis for their relationship for a future period. Their mutual obliga-
tions, to some extent at least, have been determined. The agreement
has been likened to a constitution by which the basic principles gov-
erning their conduct are stated and by which their conduct should be
measured.90 The contract may be extremely complex, covering a
multitude of subjects in great detail, or it may be relatively simple.
This is not as important as the fact that the parties have agreed to
abide by the conditions laid down in it.
85. Valley City Furniture Co., 110 N.L.R.B. 1589 (1954).
86. United Elastic Corp., 84 N.L.R.B. 768 (1949).
87. NLRB v. Sands Mfg. Co., 306 U.S. 332 (1939).
88. M. H. Ritztwoller Co. v. NLRB, 114 F.2d 432 (7th Cir. 1940).
89. Compare National Elec. Products Corp., 80 N.L.R.B. 995 (1948), with
Mastro Products Corp., 103 N.L.R.B. 511 (1953), enforcement granted, 214
F.2d 462 (2d Cir. 1954), and NLRB v. Wagner Iron Works, 220 F.2d 1-26 (7th
Cir. 1955).
90. Cox and Dunlop, The Duty to Bargain Collectively During the 'Term'of
an Existing Agreement, 63 HARV. L. REv. 1097 (1950).
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Before the contract is signed, the Board promotes what may be
regarded as an ideal concept of bargaining. Stated simply, it is that
before any change is made affecting wages, hours, or other terms and
conditions of employment, bargaining should occur before the change
rather than afterward. 91 As has been pointed out, the rule is not
necessarily absolute in every situation.92 However, the process favored
by the Board might be termed "bargaining before the fact," the fact
being the change. This is more or less a uniform system of bargaining
applicable to all business and industry within the jurisdiction of the
Board. American businesses and industries, on the other hand, are
not uniform either in size, capacity, complexity, or nature. Though
"businesses" and "industries" may seem in the abstract to be imper-
sonal, they are in fact operated by people and for people And busi-
nesses, like people, differ. Therefore, arrangements between manage-
ment and labor may be expected to differ, and this is as it shoud be
so long as the arrangements are arrived at through bargaining.
What, one may ask, has this to do with unilateral action and law?
The answer is that it has a great deal to do with it. A bargaining
agreement represents the overt agreements between management
on the one hand and a union on the other. It may represent more. The
agreement may embody by implication the unincluded dispositions
of problems which were discussed during bargaining negotiations. 3
Finally, it may even be regarded as including some understanding,
usually implicit, about facets of the employment situation which were
not mentioned or discussed at all.94 Before collective bargaining was
made mandatory in any business "affecting commerce," an employer
was free to make employment contracts as he saw fit, and collective
bargaining was permissive as distinguished from mandatory. Because
of this, an employer might be deemed to be limited in his freedom of
action only by the explicit terms of a collective agreement. Thus,
unilateral action would not be even potentially unlawful or circum-
scribed except in the area carved out by the agreement. Such an
argument has gained favor neither with the Board nor with the courts
and, therefore, will be discarded for the present. If it had been
adopted, the present section of this paper would be unnecessary, or
at least greatly restricted.
A second view of the agreement is that the duty to bargain collec-
tively, as conceived by the Board because of the act, continues with
respect to all employment conditions which were unexplored during
91. Union Mfg. Co., 95 N.L.R.B. 792 (1951); Tide Water Associated Oil Co.,
85 N.L.R.B. 1096 (1949); Tomlinson of High Point, Inc., 74 N.L.R.B. 681
(1947); General Motors Corp., 59 N.L.R.B. 1143 (1944).
92. Western Printing Co., 34 N.L.R.B. 194 (1941).
93. Jacobs Mfg. Co., 94 N.L.R.B. 1214 (1951), enforcement granted, 196 F.2d
680 (2d Cir. 1952).
94. Sullivan Dry Dock & Repair Corp., 67 N.L.R.B. 627 (1946).
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the negotiations culminating in the agreement.95 Taking this view,
any change which either party might wish to make in any employment
condition not contained in the agreement or discussed during negotia-
tions would be subject to bargaining before the fact. This is said
to be the view which the Board and the courts have adopted, pro-
moted, and enforced.9 To a large extent, this is true. However, it
may be worthwhile to examine the law as it has developed and is
developing to see to what, if any, extent a third possible concept of
collective bargaining agreements has been accomodated to the second
view.
A collective agreement may be conceived as not simply constituting
the terms included and the terms excluded but considered during
negotiations. It may be said to include the entire working relationship
as it existed at the time the agreement was reached and, probably,
signed. 97 The primary problem connected with this view is a determi-
nation of what is included. Does it mean the actual conditions at the
time? This would freeze the relationship and make it static. Human
beings are alive and active, not static. Their relationships are also
subject to change, sometimes without notice. If this be true, then
may the third, all-inclusive view mean that only the procedures by
by which the undefined employment relations are determined are
adopted? This would allow the fluidity which normally accompanies
human relationships. After all, collective agreements are to govern
the employment situation for a period of time. The second alternative,
then, would seem highly desirable. However, one must recall that
before the advent of a union, the employer himself had established
employment conditions, and the latter concept would necessarily imply,
that this procedure was to continue during the life of the contract.
It is virtually the same as the first over-all view of collective agree-
ments discussed above. But another alternative is possible, and that is
that substantive conditions are implicitly approved as to some sub-
jects about which the parties could have bargained and that the pro-
cedural methods of establishing others have bcen condoned. The
complexity of this alternative is such as to make one hestitate to
examine, much less apply, it. However, it may be seriously considered.
To say that employment conditions not discussed during bargaining
negotiations are automatically continued during the term of a con-
tract is to say too much-or not enough. Immediately one asks,
"Precisely what is 'automatically continued'?" Suppose plant rules
were the issue. Three possibilities appear. First, the exact conditions
previously prevailing, that is, the substantive rules in force at the
95. Jacobs Mfg. Co., 94 N.L.R.B. 1214 (1951), enforcement granted, 196 F.2d
680 (2d Cir. 1952); John W. Bolton & Sons, Inc., 91 N.L.R.B. 989 (1950).
96. Note, Employer Unilateral Action, 35 CORNELL L.Q. 192 (1949).
97. Cox and Dunlop, The Duty to Bargain Collectively During the Term of
an Existing Agreement, 63 HARV. L. REV. 1097 (1950).
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time the contract was signed. Second, the same method of making
the rules would be retained, i.e., the employer could unilaterally alter
the rules as necessity demanded, thereby allowing a needed flexibility
to accommodate changes in conditions. Third, the employer would have
to bargain with the union each time a rule needed to be changed,
or bargaining would be required to establish a method of changing the
rules. The Board might well prefer the latter. The union would then
receive affirmative credit for the change rather than a type of negative
credit resulting from the maintenance of the established system. It
is suggested that again the context in which the rules had been created
should be considered. That plant rules are used for purposes of
illustration is unimportant. The same result should follow whether
the conditions under consideration be job classifications, overtime
procedures, or what have you. The conditions may vary with the
cases; the method of analysis should not. The one deciding the case
should consider whether the conditions, plant rules, had been altered
often in the past or were relatively stable. If the former, then the
system by which they were promulgated might well be considered
to have remained in status quo. If the latter, then the rules them-
selves would likely be considered to have been adopted, and the
employer would violate the duty to bargain by unilaterally changing
them.
Unilateral Action, Character and Form. In order to examine the
problems concerning unilateral action after a bargaining agreement
has been signed, a distinction must be drawn between action which
is unilateral in form and action unilateral in character. The context
in which the action takes place is the categorical determinative.
Action unilateral in character is that taken by an employer without
the agreement of the union, express or implied. It is uniformly an
unfair labor practice because it is entirely inimical to the concept of
collective bargaining contained in the National Labor Relations Act.
Acts unilateral in character tend to undermine a union, and their
acervation could, and probably would, cause the unrest, discontent, and
operational interruptions which the act is calculated to reduce.
Action unilateral in form, but not in character, is that affecting
wages, hours, or other terms and conditions of employment which an
employer takes without consulting the union because prior union
consent has been given to the type of action involved. Thus, an
employer could raise wages without consulting the union if this power
were given in a management functions clause, or otherwise.08 Ordi-
narily, wage increases without prior union consultation would be
highly suspect.. However, the danger that they would tend to destroy
the union's in!1uence is absent if it has consented in advance or has
98. California Portland Cement Co., 101 N.L.R.B. 1436 (1952).
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indicated by its conduct that this was the manner in which action was
to be taken. If the action is unilateral in form only, then it would not
be an unfair labor practice. The Board may promote a "bargaining
before the fact" philosophy, but the cases in which the duty to bargain
has been applied indicate that the parties may agree on their own
peculiar procedures for bargaining once a collective agreement has
been signed. So long as they abide by their established bargaining
methods, the Board will not interfere.
We are of the opinion ... that it will not effectuate the statutory policy
of "encouraging the practice and procedure of collective bargaining" for
the Board to assume the job of policing collective contracts between
employers and labor organizations by attempting to decide whether dis-
putes as to the meaning and administration of such contracts constitute
unfair labor practices under the Act. On the contrary, we believe that
parties to collective contracts would thereby be encouraged to abandon
their efforts to dispose of disputes under the contracts through collective
bargaining or through settlement procedures mutually agreed upon by
them, and to remit the interpretation and administration of their contracts
to the Board.99
The fact that a particular bargainable subject is acted on unilaterally
is immaterial, by and large, in determining whether or not the action
is an unfair labor practice after an agreement is signed. The "by and
large" is necessary because the subject itself may be of some weight
in deciding a specific case. Changes in wage rates would likely seem
to be more suspect as unilateral action under a contract than a change,
say, in production schedules or plant rules. Initiating an incentive
plan may be an unfair practice in one case'00 and a fair one in
another.'0 ' The fact that an act is unilateral is not enough alone to
support a conclusion that it is unlawful. The collective bargaining
agreement and/or the relations of the parties must be examined in
order to ascertain the lawfulness of a particular act affecting a particu-
lar employment condition.
102
The distinction between the form and the character of unilateral
action has not been enunciated by the Board. One may suggest that,
in the reported cases, the writers have been verbose without being
articulate. However, on no other basis can the results of the cases
be said to constitute a logical development of the law. Otherwise,
the Board would appear to have jumped on its horse and ridden off
in all directions at once. When dismissing a charge that section
8 (a) (5) has been violated, the usual conclusion is that the action was
not part of a campaign to undermine the union or to avoid the duty
99 Consolidated Aircraft Corp., 47 N.L.R.B. 694, 706 (1943), enforced as
Modified, 141 F.2d 785 (9th Cir. 1944).
100. John W. Bolton & Sons, Inc., 91 N.L.R.B. 989 (1950).
101. Libby, McNeill & Libby, 65 N.L.R.B. 873 (1946).
102. NLRB v. Nash-Finch Co., 211 F.2d 622 (8th Cir. 1954).
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to bargain' 03-or, even more simply, that under the circumstances, 10 4
there has been no unfair labor practice. These vague statements may
suffice in cases involving unilateral action before a collective agree-
ment has been signed, but they are not satisfactory in cases involving
a contract. In the latter, the basis for the relationship between the
parties is different. It is not, therefore, illogical that unilateral action
should be treated on a different basis. To use the same conclusions
in both situations is to obscure the issue. It indicates that the analysis
of the cases is the same, whereas it is not, or should not be. The con-
tract makes the difference. When action is unilateral in character, it
may have a tendency to subvert a union, whether or not a collective
agreement exists; but to verbalize the case decisions in the same way
regardless of the existence of a contract befogs the necessary distinc-
tion between the form and the character of unilateral acts, The
denotation of "unilateral action" is the same regardless of the existence
of a contract. The connotation differs, and this connotative difference
is, has been, and should be decisive.
It is submitted that, properly analyzed, these cases lend further, if
not overwhelming, support to the Cox-Dunlop concept of collective
bargaining agreements. 0 5 These professors have argued that the
Board misconceives a collective agreement when it holds that subjects
not expressly covered in the agreement or considered during pre-
contract negotiations must be bargained about later if either party
desires. Rather, they regard a collective agreement as including not
only these subjects but all the subjects of bargaining, actual or
potential. This, of course, is an oversimplification of their philosophy.
However, rules governing unilateral action become almost elementary
when their view is adopted. Like other legal concepts such as con-
sideration and negligence, the difficulty is not in the theory but in the
application of the theory to specific factual situations. Perhaps, more
than has been realized, their idea has been incorporated into the
techniques used by the Board in solving problems in the area of
unilateral action after a contract has been signed.
Management Functions and Collective Bargaining. With great glee,
the announcement was made, with appropriate citations, that the day
of unilateral action was gone forever from the American labor scene;
henceforth, employers would have to bargain about every employment
condition right down to the last detailH 6 Scholars entered the lists
to argue that such a concept of collective bargaining would be both
103. Massey Gin & Mach. Works, Inc., 78 N.L.R.B. 189 (1948); W. W. Cross
& Co., 77 N.L.R.B. 1162 (1948), enforcement granted, 174 F.2d 875 (lst Cir.
1949).
104. Libby, McNeill & Libby, 65 N.L.R.B. 873 (1946).
105. Cox and Dunlop, The Duty to Bargain Collectively During the Term of
an Existing Agreement, 63 HARV. L. REV. 1097 (1950).




futile and foolish. 0 7 "Management prerogatives," a concept analagous
to the divine right of kings, was quietly renamed "management
functions," an innocuous label designed to give less offense to em-
ployees, unions, the Labor Board, and the courts. One recent pro-
nouncement is of interest and will serve superbly to state succinctly
the relevant considerations in connection with management functions
clauses.
The questions of what the parties should bargain about and what they
should leave to unilateral rather than joint determination could, of
course, be left to the parties themselves. They could decide whether to
bargain about pensions or the number of shifts in the same way that they
decide whether to have a wage increase or how much of an increase. That
would involve the possibility of a cessation of production because of
stalemate on these issues; but such an interruption is an integral part
of collective bargaining. The results might then differ from one enter-
prise to another; one might bargain about pensions, the other might not;
one might place a matter under unilateral control, the other might make
it a matter of joint determination. But such differences would be quite
in accord with the postulate of autonomous determination through collec-
tive bargaining.
In an enterprise in which collective bargaining is just making its ap-
pearance, if the law in its administration surveys the course of the
apparent bargaining and determines that it is apparent rather than real,
because of the scope of the demands for unilateral discretion, the law may
well be merely enforcing the duty to bargain rather than shaping the
content of the bargain. But in an enterprise in which collective bargaining
is an accepted and going institution, if the law commands that some
particular item must be made the subject of bargaining and may not be the
object of a firm demand for unilateral control, then to that extent the
law interferes with the parties' autonomy and shapes the content of
their bargain. Such decisions tend to become not only definitions of the
legal duty to bargain but also statements of the maximum that the parties
may in practice seek from one another. 108
Entrusting to management the power to establish certain conditions
of employment does not necessarily involve the danger which is
thought to inhere in unilateral action.10 9 Prior agreement on the way
107. TELLER, MANAGEMENT FUNCTIONS UNDER COLLEcTIVE BARGAINING 91
(1947); Cox and Dunlop, Regulation of Collective Bargaining by the National
Labor Relations Board, 63 HARV. L. REV. 389 (1950); Cox and Dunlop, The
Duty to Bargain Collectively During the Term of an Existing Agreement, 63
HARV. L. REV. 1097 (1950).
108. Shulman, Reason, Contract, and Law in Labor Relations, 68 HARV. L.
REV. 999, 1000-01 (1955).
109. But the Board adopted an attitude unfavorable to bargaining for broad
management functions clauses by which an employer was given exclusive
control of one or more employment conditions. Singer Mfg. Co. v. NLRB,
119 F.2d 131 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 313 U.S. 595 (1941); Register Publishing
Co., 44 N.L.R.B. 834 (1942). Admittedly, an employer would be hard pressed
to justify an insistence that wages must be left to his determination, though
one did persuade a court, but not the Board, that such a position was reason-
able. NLRB v. Norfolk Shipbuilding & Drydock Corp., 195 F.2d 632 (4th Cir.
1952). Justification for establishing exclusive management control over items
like merit increases, incentive systems, shift schedules, etc., would not be as
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in which employment conditions are to be determined precludes any
undermining of the bargaining agent or disparagement of the bar-
gaining process. The use of management functions clauses accomo-
dates management functions to collective bargaining. They become
a mutually agreed upon procedure and the mutuality of the agreement
dissolves the basis for fears that an employer's unilateral acts will
insidiously affect the union by indicating to employees that they do
not need to organize in order to obtain satisfactory employment terms.
Thus, an employer's action pursuant to such an agreement is perhaps
the best possible illustration of action unilateral in form only.
The Thesis and the Cases. The cases which may be said to support
the outlined theory are few. This is not unexpected and for at least
two reasons. A union would have little reason to complain about
hard to find. Nonetheless, the Board has found that insistence by an employer
on leaving a bargaining item as a management function is evidence of bad
faith bargaining. Gay Paree Undergarment Co., 91 N.L.R.B. 1363 (1950).
A sharp rebuke for its attitude toward bargaining for management functions
clauses was handed the Board by the United States Supreme Court. NLRB v.
American Nat'l Ins. Co., 343 U.S. 395 (1952). The employer had insisted on a
clause leaving management free to hire, promote, discharge, discipline for
cause, and schedule working hours. The Board assumed the position that
insisting on the clause was a per se violation of § 8(a) (5) because it effectively
removed from the area of bargaining the subjects included in it. In an
opinion by the late Chief Justice Vinson, the Court indicated that a more
moderate attitude would be necessary and that the Board was to apply the
test of good faith to the negotiations. Not all management functions clauses
were to be condemned. In a dissent which was not unexpected, Justices Min-
ton, Black, and Douglas maintained that the employer was in effect demanding
that the union waive bargaining on the subjects covered by the clause, Id. at
410. They would have required bargaining on each and every subject
involved.
With some semblance of good grace, the Board bowed to the will of the
Court in a case the next year and held that an employer's insistence on the
right to control all the "important" terms and conditions of employment
coupled with a demand that the union give up the right to strike was evidence
that negotiations were not being conducted in good faith. It did not bow low
enough, and its order to bargain was refused enforcement. United Clay Mines
Corp., 102 N.L.R.B. 1368 (1953), enforcement denied, 219 F.2d 120 (6th Cir.
1955).
Prior to the American National Insurance decision in the Supreme Court,
the Board had indicated that management functions clauses could be discussed
in bargaining. Alabama Marble Co., 83 N.L.R.B. 1047 (1949); Standard
Generator Serv. Co., 90 N.L.R.B. 790 (1950). To insist on them to the point of
an impasse would be an unfair labor practice. Dixie Culvert Mfg. Co., 87
N.L.R.B. 554 (1949); Franklin Hosiery Mills, 83 N.L.R.B. 276 (1949). The
case would seem to have changed that process of thinking. If an employer may
bargain for such a clause in good faith, then it would seem to follow that he
could bargain for it even to the extent of reaching an impasse, with the con-
ventional results on the scope of lawful unilateral action. If a management
functions clause is proper for bargaining purposes, no good reason appears
for treating it differently from any other subject, assuming, of course, that the
bargaining was in good faith. If it were not, then any impasse would have
been brought about by the employer's unfair labor practice and, according to
the usual rule in such cases, he would not be allowed to exercise unilateral
action to implement the proposed contractual term after the impasse. Reed
& Prince Mfg. Co., 96 N.L.R.B. 850 (1951), enforcement granted, 205 F.2d 131
(1st Cir.), cert. denied, 346 U.S. 887 (1953); NLRB v. Andrew Jergens Co.,
175 F.2d 130, (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 338 U.S. 827 (1949).
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action unilateral in form and therefore the Board would not often have
to face the issue. Second, proof that the action is unilateral in form
rather than character may be difficult to come by. Also, the Board
may draw inferences from the facts,"0 and since collective bargaining
is the fashion, it may tend to draw inferences unfavorable to unilateral
action in whatever form. However, when squarely confronted by the
problem, both before and after the Taft-Hartley amendments, it has
conformed to the suggested distinction."' In the cases in which
unilateral action was held to be unlawful, either another ground was
available for the decision 1 2 or the evidence indicated that the action
was unilateral in character. 1 3 Consequently, some employers have
acted without impunity in unilaterally changing wages, hours, and
other terms and conditions of employment." 4 That the changes were
held to be unfair does not detract from the proposed analysis of the
problem.
In Crown Zellerbach Corporation,115 the employer decided to experi-
ment with a new type of machine and, deeming the contractual wage
rate inapplicable, bargained directly with the individual employee
selected to work with the new machine. He agreed to work for a
wage below the level set by contract. Later, the union protested and
insisted on the contractual rate even though the company explained
its position. Unfair labor practice charges were filed after the em-
ployer refused the union's demands. The charges were dismissed.
During a long, amicable collective bargaining relationship, the com-
pany had made several similar changes in the past and had reached
an agreement with the union after its unilateral action. The Board
indicated that the instance was an isolated one and not part of a
conscious campaign to undermine the union. Further, it considered
the contractual grievance procedure adequate to settle any dispute
over the matter.
Here is a case in which the bargaining power of a large company
was pitted against that of a single employee. He agreed to work for
a wage lower than that established by a collective agreement and
there was no bargaining before the fact with the union, his selected
bargaining representative. If ever, it would appear that the Board
110. NLRB v. Nevada Consol. Copper Corp., 316 U.S. 105 (1942).
111. Borden Co., 110 N.L.R.B. 802 (1954); Massey Gin & Mach. Works, Inc.,
78 N.L.R.B. 189 (1948); W. W. Cross & Co., 77 N.L.R.B. 1162 (1948), enforce-
ment granted, 174 F.2d 875 (1st Cir. 1949); Libby, McNeill & Libby, 65 N.L.R.B.
873 (1946).
112. Tide Water Associated Oil Co., 85 N.L.R.B. 1096 (1949); Allied Mills, Inc.
82 N.L.R.B. 854 (1949); Carroll's Transfer Co., 56 N.L.R.B. 935 (1944).
113. John W. Bolton & Sons, Inc., 91 N.L.R.B. 989 (1950); United States
Automatic Corp., 57 N.L.R.B. 124 (1944).
114. NLRB v. Highland Shoe, Inc., 119 F.2d 218 (1st Cir. 1941); General
Motors Corp., 81 N.L.R.B. 779 (1949), enforcement granted, 179 F.2d 221
(2d Cir. 1950); Inland Steel Co., 77 N.L.R.B. 1, enforcement granted, 170 F.2d
247 (7th Cir. 1948), cert. denied, 336 U.S. 960 (1949).
115. 95 N.L.R.B. 753 (1951).
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should, in righteous indignation, apply the full sanctions of the act.
However, it merely dismissed the charges. The past conduct of the
parties indicated that this was their accepted bargaining procedure,
i.e., they had been in the habit of allowing the company to act first
and then discuss its action with the union. If this inference is drawn
from the facts and if the parties are to be allowed to handle their own
problems, the Board's decision was inevitable, and irreproachable.
One might possibly disagree with the evidentiary inference, but it is
more difficult to disagree with the theory underlying the result
unless a pat pattern of bargaining is to be enforced in every type of
union-management relationship. Quaere whether either unions or
employers would submit to such a standard.
Massey Gin and Machine Works, Inc.," 6 involved a decision by the
Board as to whether an employer had violated the duty to bargain
by changing the hours when shifts began. The subject apparently
had not been considered during negotiations nor expressly included
in the agreement in force when the changes were made. After the
changes, the union protested, and the parties bargained about the
matter and came to an agreement. Previously, a similar change had
been made without either union protest or prior bargaining. The
contract was held to be ambiguous on the question of the employer's
right or power to effect the change, and the charges were dismissed.
The Board added that the employer should have notified the union in
advance of the change, an indication that it would intrude its bar-
gaining before the fact concept into the' relationship. One would
venture that the Board's suggestion was a superfluous gratuity. The
prior conduct of the parties was a sufficient ground for finding that the
change of shift hours was made in accordance with their usual practice
and was consistent with their contractual relationship. The employer's
action would be characterized as unilateral in form and therefore
permissible.
Finally, the case of California Portland Cement Company"7 may be
mentioned. An existing agreement gave the employer the right to
raise "wages" unilaterally, and the compensation of salaried employees
was unilaterally increased without protest from the union. The
Board, while it found other unfair practices in the case, held that this
particular action was not unlawful. The trial examiner had regarded
the raise as unfair, taking the contractual language literally. The
Board, on the contrary, decided that the behavior of the parties, and
that of the union in particular, clarified any ambiguity in the contract.
Acquiescence in the unilateral action by the union was sufficient to
show that the parties, when they said "wages," meant both wages and
salaries. Therefore, the action was unilateral in form only.
116. 78 N.L.R.B. 189 (1948).
117. 101 N.L.R.B. 1436 (1952).
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The Board has been a bit wary of concluding that by signing a
collective bargaining agreement either an employer or a union has
waived the right to bargain about employment conditions which were
not discussed during negotiations leading to the agreement. The right
to future bargaining may be expressly reserved in the contract,118
or a refusal to recognize an established condition as bargainable may
be the ground for forcing bargaining even after an agreement has
been signed. 1 9 An employer's unilateral action on the subject after a
contract had been signed would be an unfair labor practice because the
union could not be considered to have agreed to it in advance.
Unilateral Action and the Interpretation of Collective Bargaining
Agreements. If the express terms of a collective bargaining agreement
constituted the total relationship between employer and union, then
nothing outside the contract would be of any interest to the union
during the term of the contract. However, this is not always the way
contracts have been treated. In Nash-Finch Company,120 the individ-
ual contracts with many of the employees before the union was
designated to represent a part of them had called for annual Christmas
bonuses along with hospitalization and group life insurance. The em-
ployees were told that these benefits would probably be eliminated
if a union came. During negotiations with the union for a contract,
the union proposed the following clause:
The Employer agrees that all conditions of employment relating to wages,
hours of work, overtime differentials, and general working conditions shall
be maintained at not less than the highest minimum standards in effect
at the time of the signing of this agreement, and the conditions of employ-
ment shall be improved wherever specific provisions for improvement
are made elsewhere in this agreement.121
This was rejected by the employer, and the following clause was used
in its place:
Maintenance of Standards. The Employer agrees that wages, hours of
work, overtime differentials, and general working conditions shall be
maintained at not less than the highest minimum standard specified in this
agreement and the conditions of the employment shall be improved
wherever specific provisions for improvement are made elsewhere in this
agreement.122
118. Allied Mills, Inc., 82 N.L.R.B. 854 (1949). See NLRB v. Black-Clawson
Co., 210 F.2d 523 (6th Cir. 1954) (right to bargain about pension plan reserved
by union in signing collective agreement, but union held to have acquiesced
in its later unilateral initiation by employer).
119. NLRB v. General Motors Corp., 179 F.2d 221 (2d Cir. 1950); Inland
Steel Co. v. NLRB, 170 F.2d 247 (7th Cir. 1948), cert. denied, 336 U.S. 960
(1949); NLRB v. J. H. Allison & Co., 165 F.2d 766 (6th Cir.), cert. denied, 335
U.S. 814 (1948).
120. 103 N.L.R.B. 1695 (1953), enforcement denied, 211 F.2d 622 (8th Cir.
1954).
121. NLRB v. Nash-Finch Co., 211 F.2d 622, 624 (8th Cir. 1954).
122. Id. at 625.
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The Christmas bonuses and other benefits apparently were not dis-
cussed, but a wage raise was agreed upon. After the agreement
was signed, the employer unilaterally withdrew the benefits from the
employees covered by the collective agreement but retained them for
the other employees. However, the latter did not receive the wage
increase given the employees represented by the union. The Board
applied its usual line of reasoning in considering the case. The bene-
fits had not been consciously explored or discussed during negotia-
tions; .and, therefore, before the employer could make any valid
change in them, the union had to be consulted. After ruling that
section 8 (a) (5) had been violated, the Board indicated that the union
might be willing to forego these conditions but that it should not be
considered to have waived the right to bargain about them because of
the words of the contract.
The Board's order to bargain was not enforced by a court of ap-
peals.123 It looked at the words of the contract and construed them
literally in determining what the employer had bound himself to do.
The union members knew that the employer did not intend to maintain
the benefits unless required specifically to do so, the change in the
contract further indicated this, and the fact that employees not
covered by the contract retained the benefits was also given weight.
Because of this, the court reasoned that the union had made its bargain
and would have to keep it for the duration of the agreement since it
should have known the effect of the words it had used in creating the
contract. Thus, the employer was relieved of any duty to maintain
the benefits or to bargain about abolishing them. The employment
conditions not considered during negotiations were not carried over
in status quo because a bargain had been struck on money items and
no other provision of the contract could be construed as indicating
that prior conditions not covered by the contract would be continued.
The court's opinion represents a strict attitude in construing con-
tracts with labor organizations and a tendency to hold the union and
the employer to the meaning of the words used. Both the union and
the employer appear to have been gambling on a later determination
for both as to the meaning of the agreement, and the union lost in
the end. Here, because of the terms of the contract, the unilateral
elimination of the prior benefits was considered unilateral in form
since the union was held to have waived their maintenance. The
context in which the action took place governed the result. The
judicial attitude represents something of a departure from the free-
wheeling days of yore when a union was always given the benefit
of any doubt. 'Here the court felt that there was no doubt about the
result which should have been reached and accordingly rendered its
decision.
123. NLRB v. Nash-Finch Co., 211 F.2d 622 (8th Cir. 1954).
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In a prior case on somewhat similar facts,124 the Board had reached
the same conclusion before the Taft-Hartley amendments, and they
appear not to have had any effect on the decision by the court in the
Nash-Finch case, which is distinguishable on two grounds from the
usual line of decisions. First, the benefits in question were money
items, and money items had been consciously explored during negotia-
tions.125 Second, by reading the contract literally, the employer ap-
peared bound only to maintain the employment conditions provided
for by contract, not both conditions established by contract and condi-
tions otherwise prevailing at the time.
Perhaps it would be wise to recall here that neither the union nor
the employer considered it desirable to mention the employment con-
ditions in question during pre-contract negotiations. Whatever their
reasons, the fact remains that a condition of employment persisting
at the time of bargaining conferences was not overtly considered.
This would lend credence to an argument that an employer's con-
tinuation of the established condition after signing the agreement
would not be an unfair labor practice. A decision would have to be
made as to Whether the exact condition prevailing when the contract
was signed was to be continued or whether the procedure by which it
was established was continued. The decision would necessarily rest
on the particular facts of the case. If the condition were continued,
any change would be unfair. If the employer's procedure had been
retained, a finding that his subsequent unilateral changes were unlaw-
ful would be inconsistent with the proposed analysis. Moreover, if
Board precedent is entitled to any respect, it would be inconsistent
with prior treatment of the problem.126 However, any change in the
procedure itself would be illicit because the union could not be said
to have assented thereto.
If unilateral changes in employment conditions not included in the
contract would be an unfair labor practice, then certainly unilateral
changes in the express terms of the agreement would be unfair, too,
in the absence of peculiar circumstances. Otherwise, the contract
would not limit or confine the employer's power to exercise unilateral
action, and the situation would be the same as if a union had not been
designated as collective bargaining agent. Because grievance pro-
cedures are becoming more prevalentand because'any changes in the
contract by the employer might possibly be settled by utilizing them,
the problem should not arise too often. An employer's refusal to
124. Sullivan Dry Dock & Repair Corp., 67 N.L.R.B. 627 (1946).
125. But see NLRB v. Jacobs Mfg. Co., 196 F.2d 680 (2d Cir. 1952) (employer
required to bargain about -pensions when wages re-opened under contract
because pensions had not been discussed in previous bargaining).
126. Crown Zellerbach Corp., 95 N.L.R.B. 753 (1951); Massey Gin & Mach.




follow a contractual grievance procedure, however, would be treated
as violative of sections 8(a) (1) and (5) because it is through the
grievance procedure that the contracting parties have agreed to
conduct their bargaining during the term of the contract.121 Whether
a contractual grievance procedure should first be exhausted before
a complaining union should be able to appeal to the Board is beyond
the scope of this paper.'2
The terms of a collective agreement may be affected in three
ways by an employer's conduct. First, the provisions contained
therein may not be followed. Second, new conditions may be intro-
duced which were not provided for by contract. Third, the employer
may both ignore the contract and introduce new conditions. Only
the latter two variances need be considered here. If the employer
simply failed to comply with his contractual obligations, there might
be a private action for damages, but the Board would not become
involved unless there appeared to be a conscious campaign to under-
mine the union.129
In the days when a closed shop was lawful, an employer was held
to have violated the duty to bargain and to have interfered with the
exercise of his employees' section 7 rights by hiring new employees
independently of the union even though the contract contained a closed
shop clause.130 Another employer violated the same sections of the
act by establishing a separate grievance procedure for employees who
were not members of the union though the agreement contained a
grievance procedure applicable to all the employees in the unit.131
Their grievances were settled without allowing the union to be pre-
sent, and it was simply notified of the settlements. In both cases,
the Board found that by ignoring the contracts and by acting in
derogation of them, the employers had effectively changed the terms
of the contracts and had made new ones directly with the employees
involved. 32 This type of behavior, of course, is the sort which will
not be tolerated by the Board.
127. Inland Steel Co. v. NLRB, 170 F.2d 247 (7th Cir. 1948), cert. denied,
336 U.S. 960 (1949).
128. See Cox and Dunlop, The Duty to Bargain Collectively During the
Term of an Existing Agreement, 63 HARV. L. REV. 1097 (1950).
129. Consolidated Aircraft Corp., 47 N.L.R.B. 694, 706 (1943), enforced as
modified, 141 F.2d 785 (9th Cir. 1944).
130. Carrol's Transfer Co., 56 N.L.R.B. 935 (1944).
131. United States Automatic Corp., 57 N.L.R.B. 124 (1944).
132. In both cases, the employers had refused to follow the grievance
machinery established by contract after the union protested the companies'
actions. Therefore, it was actually unnecessary for the Board to decide
whether the acts in question were in derogation of the contracts. By refusing
to-bargain about the changes in the way they had agreed to do, the employers
had furnished the Board with ample grounds for holding that the statute had
been violated. However, the latter point was not relied on when the specific
changes involved were held td be unfair-labor practices. This begins to look
like "policing collective contracts" which,, the year before these cases were
decided, the Board had declared it would not engage in. Consolidated Aircraft
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A totally new employment condition may be added unilaterally
while a collective agreement is in force, though the addition would
probably be a violation of the duty to bargain unless some provision
in the contract allowed the employer to exercise such control over the
employment situation. Usually the Board has not had to rely on the
addition itself in finding a violation of section 8 (a) (5) since often the
employer either had refused to submit to the grievance machinery
33
or had maintained that the subject was not one about which bargaining
could be required. 3 4 It may also rely on the provisions of section
8 (d) in finding that the action was unlawful because a violation
of section 8 (d) would be a violation of the duty to bargain contained
in section 8 (a) (5) .35
In one rather interesting case, there was much disagreement as to
the facts on which a decision should be based and what the legal
effect of the facts was.1 36 An employer unilaterally introduced a pen-
sion plan during the term of an agreement which made no provision
for such a plan. He maintained both that the plan was not subject
to mandatory bargaining and that he had complied with any duty to
bargain about it. The Board and the court agreed that the plan was
subject to bargaining. The plan had been announced unilaterally dur-
ing the life of one collective agreement, but it applied to all the em-
ployees and not just to those represented. by the union. During
negotiations for a new agreement, the union reserved the right to bar-
gain during the term of the new agreement about any pension plan.
The contract was later opened to negotiate a wage raise, but the plan
was not discussed. At that time the employer was negotiating directly
with the employees about the plan, and the union objected to the
Corp., 47 N.L.R.B. 694, 706 (1943), enforced as modified, 141 F.2d 785 (9th Cir.
1944). If the grievance procedures were adequate to handle the problems
involved, the disputes might have been settled privately by an .order from the
Board to the employers to subject the disputes to the grievance machinery.
The Board's finding that a company had refused to bargain when it insisted
that the contractual grievance procedure be followed for bargaining about a
dispute concerning the contract was not sustained by a court which determined
that the grievance machinery was adequate for resolving the 'conflict. Timken
Roller Bearing Co. v. NLRB, 161 F.2d 949 (6th Cir. 1947). If the disputes were
not cognizable under the grievance procedure, then the Board would have had
to resolve the conflict. The resolution would necessarily depend on an inter-
pretation of the contract, and the Board should avoid this sort of thing as often
as possible, as it appears to have done at times in the past." California Portland
Cement Co., 101 N.L.R.B. 1436 (1952); Consolidated Aircraft -Corp., 47 N.L.R.B.
694 (1943), enforced as modified, 141 F.2d 785 (9th Cir. 1944). It seems to
have enough difficulty in interpreting the National Labor Relations Act and
the facts of the cases presented to it. NLRB v. American Nat'l Ins. Co.,, 343
U.S. 395 (1952); Nash-Finch Co. v. NLRB, 211 F.2d 622 (8th Cir. 1954); NLRB
v. Black-Clawson Co., 210 F.2d 523 (6th Cir. 1954).
133. Inland Steel Co., 77 N.L.R.B. 1,, enforcement granted, 170-F.2d 247 (7th
Cir. 1948), dert. denied, 336 U.S. 960 -(1949). .
134. NLRB v. General Motors Corp., 179 F2d 221 (2d Cir. 1950).':-
135. John W. Bolton & Sons, Inc., 91 N.L.R.B. 989, (1950).,
136. Black-Clawson Co., 103 N.L.R.B. 928 (1953), enforcement denied, 210
F.2d 523 (6th Cir. 1954). -
1956 ]
VANDERBILT LAW REVIEW
direct negotiations with employees. Then the plan was adopted.
The trial examiner held that the union had never requested to bargain
about the plan and that therefore no unfair labor practice had been
committed. The Board refused to follow this and held that bargaining
had been specifically requested. It also stated that a union which has
a contract with an employer need not request bargaining on any
change the employer wishes to make but that rather the employer
is obliged to go to the union. The Board's order to bargain was denied
enforcement because the court ruled that the union must be held to
have acquiesced in the establishment of the plan even though it ob-
jected to the employer's method of direct dealing with the employees.
The union had been notified of the employer's intention to introduce
the plan and had been consulted about it. Therefore, though the
action was unilateral in form, it was not unilateral in character and
no unfair labor practice was involved.
The various opinions in the case demonstrate how suitable facts
may be selected from the evidence to support a conclusion and a re-
sult. The Board relied on one set of findings, not those used by the
trial examiner, and reached its usual result when that particular set
of facts is present. The court, relying on a different interpretation of
the facts, reached the opposite result. The union seemed to have been
more concerned with the form or ritual to be indulged in bargaining
than with the substance of the pension plan itself, and the same court
has indicated some impatience with the Board's emphasis on form in
these matters.1
37
Employment conditions considered during pre-contract negotiations
but not included in the contract remain to be considered. Whether or
not unilateral action affecting them would be an unfair labor practice
would seem to depend on the disposition made during bargaining.
There is no further duty to bargain about them for the life of the con-
tract.13 8 Virtually no cases exist in this area, probably because any
disputes are settled through a grievance procedure in the contract or
through private and voluntary negotiations between the employer
and the union.
In a recent case,139 a union proposed that the contract include a
provision stating that milk deliveries would be continued to be made
seven days a week. There was already a provision that the workweek
would be five days. The proposal about deliveries was rejected, and
the contract did not contain any mention of deliveries other than
that they could not be scheduled for hours earlier than seven in the
137. NLRB v. Reeder Motor Car Co., 202 F.2d 802 (6th Cir. 1953) (employees
may repudiate a union without formality).
138. Jacobs Mg. Co., 94 N.L.R.B. 1214 (1951), enforcement granted, 196 F.2d
680 (2d Cir. 1952).
139. Borden Co., 110 N.L.R.B. 802 (1954).
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morning. After signing the contract, the employer unilaterally
scheduled deliveries for only six days a week rather than seven. The
union complained, but the employer refused to discuss the matter.
The union's appeal to the Board was unsuccessful. Consideration had
been given to the workweek and to the number of delivery days.
By rejecting the union's request for seven days of deliveries and by
not making any other provision about them, the employer became
entitled to establish them as he saw fit, subject only to the limitation
that they could not be scheduled before the hour designated by con-
tract. Section 8(d) was held to foreclose further discussion during
the life of the contract.
Suppose an employer suggests during bargaining negotiations that
a new condition be implemented, for instance, that a system of merit
increases be established. If the union rejects the proposal, then the
employer should be held guilty of an unfair labor practice if he later
institutes such a system during the life of the contract. If the union
had indicated indifference to the proposal, it is suggested that an em-
ployer's unilateral institution of the condition during the period
covered by the contract would not be an unfair practice. The union
would have indicated that whether or not the condition should prevail
would be a matter for the employer to decide. If the employer then
acts, the union should not be heard to complain.
If the employer's proposal relates to a change in an existing condi-
tion and the union rejects the proposed change but not the condition
itself, though it is not provided for in the contract, the condition should
be maintained in status quo, and any unilateral change would be
unlawful. By way of illustration, suppose a company had been con-
sulting the union before making merit increases and proposed that it
be given that function exclusively. The company could not lawfully
grant merit increases unilaterally during the contract if the union
rejected the proposal. Rather, prior consultation with the union before
giving any increases should be continued. However, had the union
expressed itself as indifferent to the change, it cared neither one way
nor the other, then the employer presumably would not be guilty of
an unfair labor practice if a unilateral change were made. A union's
rejection of the proposed change of condition and a rejection of the
continuance of the condition itself would mean that the employer
could not continue the condition after the contract had been signed.
A union may also make demands and drop them without their being
included in the contract. The technique in dealing with such sugges-
tions should be the same, though the results, as far as the scope of
unilateral action is concerned, might differ. A union's suggestion
of changing an established condition could be answered in two
ways. The employer might reject the proposed change, and the
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condition should Tbe carried forward in status quo. Also, the em-
ployer might reject both the suggested change and the condition it-
self. Then -it would be !an unfair practice to continue the condition
after signing the contract. For instance, if the union demanded that
the employer consult it prior to granting merit increases when this
had not been the custom in the past, if the employer rejected the
demand, the system of unilaterally granting merit increases should be
continued under the new agreement as it had been in the past. A
unilateral change in the procedure of granting the increases would be
an unfair practice. If during bargaining, the employer refused to
continue granting merit increases, they would then be eliminated for
the duration of the contract and granting them would be illegal. The
Board essentially followed this line of reasoning in the case involving
milk deliveries.140 The-union proposed a change in the method whereby
the number of deliveries was determined. The employer had had
freedom of action previously. When the change was rejected, then
the condition, the employer's freedom of action, was carried forward
during the new contract. An assumption that the employer would
reject any system of deliveries would be absurd for presumably that
would put the company out of business.
A union might -also demand the institution of a new employment
condition. If the employer rejected the demand, any unilateral initia-
tion of the condition after signing the contract would be unlawful.
If the union requested that a system of merit increases be created
and the employer refused, they could not be given unilaterally during
the life of the contract without violating section 8 (a) (5).
These problems should not often arise for the Board's consideration
since a collective bargaining agreement would usually care for them.
When they do, the evidence may be quite conflicting, particularly if
the Board continues to regard as evidence of bad faith an insistence
that a stenographer be present during negotiations.' 4 ' The fact that
similar problems have in fact come before the Board and the possibility
that they may do so again in the future has made their consideration
necessary.
CONCLUSION
In treating the problems discussed above, the Board has demon-
strated a feeling of distrust for unilateral acts by employers. Unilateral
action before a collective agreement has been signed will almost
inevitably be a breach of the duty to bargain collectively so long as
the concept of bargaining before the fact prevails. Difficult problems
140. Ibid.
141. Reed & Prince Mfg. Co., 96 N.L.R.B. 850 (1951), enforcement granted,
205 F.2d 131 (1st Cir.), cert. denied, 346 U.S. 887 (1953).
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will therefore confront both unions-and management if unfair labor
practice charges are to be avoided. Day-to-day changes necessitated
by business conditions may involve the negotiating parties in trivial
debates over the necessity or appropriateness of proposed changes.
However, sensible arrangements may be derived for conducting the
business during the interim between the request for bargaining and
the signing of the agreement.
Strikes and impasses have presented the Board with a variety of
problems which it has treated with a sense of reality. Though in-
dividual bargaining may be undesirable when a union has been
designated as the collective bargaining agent, when faced with an
impasse in negotiations or certain types of strikes, an employer would
often be virtually helpless if individual bargaining were not permitted.
The Board's realization of this appears to have guided it when pre-
sented with these problems.
After a collective bargaining agreement has been signed, uni-
lateral action may or may not have the vice which inheres in it in
other circumstances. The distinction between the form and the
character of unilateral conduct is therefore necessary for a considera-
tion of unilateral acts during the life of a collective agreement.
Despite the fact that the Board has not articulated the distinction in
so many words, an examination of the cases seems to indicate that it
has been followed. When it is, a rational result should be reached.
Recent cases indicate judicial and administrative tendencies to hold
both labor and management to their agreements and-to construe those
agreements strictly. The benefits of this may redound to either
the union or the employer in each case. Though this may not be the
best labor policy possible, in the long run unions and unionization
should survive if their attractiveness to employees and their functions
in serving the interests of employees have validity.
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